Category Archives: Capacity Building
Prioritization — The Easiest Way to Improve Governance
Fragile states have limited capacity to govern. They have few highly trained policymakers, few managers able to organize departments and ministries, and few officials able to implement decisions. They have very limited financial resources and little prospect (unless they have a lot of natural resources) of becoming self-sustaining anytime soon. Why then do we ask them to do so much?
These deficits are not going away anytime soon. As Lant Pritchett and Frauke de Weijer pointed out in their paper on capability traps, fragile states are:
far from any threshold of “good governance”; at their pace or average pace of progress it would take very (to infinitely) long to reach a threshold; even at very to extremely optimistic accelerations of the pace of progress . . . the time from fragile states to reach solid levels of governance is measured in decades, not years.
Yet, such countries are expected to do more or less everything much more developed countries do. They must deliver adequate public services to all their people, adopt and enforce an enormous number of laws and regulations, and meet international standards in a wide range of areas. If they receive substantial sums of foreign aid, they must deal with each donor on every project and meet all their specific requirements. Is any of this realistic? (more…)
Somalia’s 20-Year Experiment in Hybrid Governance
By Ken Menkhaus, Davidson College
The below are excerpts from an article originally appearing in World Politics Review.
Later this month, Somalia’s eight-year political transition is scheduled to end with the declaration of a “post-transition” government. Casual observers will be forgiven for assuming such a step signals that, after 21 years of complete state collapse, a functional central government in Somalia is now in place.
The reality is that the post-transition government will be unable to project its authority beyond much of the capital, Mogadishu. Most of the country and parts of the capital itself remain under the de facto control of autonomous strongmen, self-proclaimed regional states, clan militias and the jihadi group al-Shabab. Of these, only al-Shabab has demonstrated any will and capacity to impose basic law and order in its areas of control, but the group is losing ground to multiple armed offensives and is focusing its waning energies on war-fighting, not administration. (more…)
How Do States Learn?
Everyone in the development field recognizes that learning is essential to development. But what kind of learning matters most?
For most major development actors, the emphasis is squarely on individual learning. Achieving universal primary education, for instance, is the second Millennium Development Goal, coming just after ending poverty and hunger. Organizations such as the World Bank believe that education is “universally recognized as one of the most fundamental building blocks for human development and poverty reduction,” and that, as DFID puts it, it is “fundamental to everything we do.”
Yet, societies and states must also learn if they are to develop the new institutions, new knowledge, and new capacities that are essential to creating wealth, improving governance, and enhancing resilience. And this larger, macro level learning requires very different types of investments from those individuals need—investments that rarely get prioritized in the development field. (more…)
Can Informal Accountability Replace Elections?
Improving the accountability of leaders tops the agenda of just about everyone involved with development. But the preferred solution—elections—often comes up short in countries with divided populations and democratic structures that are not well institutionalized. There is a great need for alternatives.
Such alternatives can take many forms—including improving governance, enhancing the rule of law, promoting transparency, decentralizing government (where leaders might be held more accountable in some cases), ensuring equity in governance and the distribution of resources (which may matter more than better governance), and increasing the leverage of societal groups to monitor the performance of state officials.
One neglected area that deserves much more attention is promoting social cohesion. Indeed, it can be argued that the greatest difference between the successful developmental states and their far less successful developing country peers is the degree of social cohesion.
But how do you promote social cohesion when it is lacking? (more…)
The Moral Foundations of Good Governance
One of the biggest differences between strong and weak states is the nature of the moral imperatives that operate in the public realm. Whereas in well-governed countries, people feel obligated to act according to certain minimum ethical standards, in badly governed countries they do not. There are many reasons for this divergence, most notably differences in the effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms, the area that receives by far the most attention from donors and reformers alike.
But there is a deeper, more important cause of the dysfunction that plagues governments in fragile states that is rarely considered or addressed. (more…)
Strengthening the Rule of Law in Developing Countries
Many fragile states suffer from incoherent legal systems. Whereas in developed countries, one single system exists and is effectively enforced, in fragile states multiple systems work side-by-side, each weakly enforced, and often operating in contradiction with each other. Creating a unified and robust system of law is one of the biggest challenges these countries face.
In most cases, this incoherence is a direct product of colonialism. One system, often with the greatest relevancy to local populations, has roots in the precolonial system of governance. It may have evolved a lot since then, but is still based on local circumstances and institutions. The state, itself a product of foreign rule, follows another system, based on Western legal tradition, imported from abroad. Neither is consistently or equitably implemented. Corruption distorts outcomes. Officials (whether those of the state or local leaders) lack training. Favoritism is common.
In some places, religion comes into play with its own system (such as Sharia), creating three legal layers, each with its own logic. Outcomes and incentives can be widely divergent. Local systems may also vary tremendously by location, creating a complex mosaic of different mixes of different systems depending where in a country one is. (more…)
How Foreign Aid Succeeds and Fails at the Same Time
There is a sharp dichotomy in opinions about foreign aid.
Many, from Jeffrey Sachs to Bill Gates to Charles Kenny, have argued that it has been a great success. As Gates explains:
Aid money can and does work. It improves people’s lives and makes the world a better and safer place. . . . Wasteful and corrupt aid projects are probably inevitable, and they should never be tolerated. But overall, when you look at the big picture, quite a lot of good things are happening.
Others, most famously William Easterly and Dambisa Moyo, have argued that aid has not delivered on its promises. As Easterly puts it,
Each foreign aid bureaucracy is responsible for everything, all the aid bureaucracies together are collectively responsible for all this “everything,” and in this bureaucratic maze with no exits, nobody is individually responsible for anything. . . . It is a fallacy to think that overall poverty can be ended by a comprehensive package of “things,” like malaria medicines and clean water.
Is there any logical explanation for this divergence beyond the biases that these personalities have? Is there any way that both groups might be right (or wrong)? (more…)
More on Capacity Building, Foreign aid, Governance, Policies, Poverty
Can We Improve Governance When There Is No Government?
Many fragile states maintain a very limited presence in large parts of their territory and lack the capacity to effectively govern even when present. Is there any way to improve governance in such places without depending on the government?
In other words, are there mechanisms to promote collective goods in areas where political institutions are too weak to adopt and enforce collectively binding rules?
Although governance is usually considered a product of government (the state), empirical evidence suggests that areas of weak or limited statehood do not necessarily have weak governance. “Governance without a state” is a reality in many parts of the world, including Somaliland, parts of the eastern DRC, and places where warlords, multinationals (MNCs), or NGOs provide some public goods.
More on Capacity Building, Fragile States, Governance, Review
Legal Pluralism: Improving Security and Justice in Fragile States
Improving security and justice in fragile states is a major theme for political leaders, scholars, and donors. Foreign aid agencies have spent billions attempting to catalyze improvements in these areas within other countries. Yet despite this money and much hard work, the track record of past efforts has been paltry.
Why?
A large part of the reason can be traced to how these issues–and the concept of state building–is approached. (more…)
More on Africa, Capacity Building, Foreign aid, Fragile States, Governance, Review
Political Economic Analysis: Is there a Better Way?
Donors have increasingly sought to make use of political economy analysis (PEA) over the past decade, especially in fragile states. At their best, such frameworks provide a much better understanding of how power, sociopolitical dynamics, capacity, informal institutions, incentives, and sources of opposition interact and shape policy decisions and implementation. Diagnosing political drivers and obstacles and capacity assets and constraints ought to improve donor strategies and aid allocation decisions.
Of course, turning this into practical results has not been easy. Analyses can be too vague or broad, not sufficiently relevant (as when opportunities are not identified), or simply wrong (by, for instance, missing key variables). PEA can be done well but have limited effect on donor behavior if the latter is not positioned to take advantage. (more…)
