Tag Archives: terrorism
West Africa: Ethnic Divisions, State Fragility, and Regional Solutions
There has been a lot of bad news out of West Africa recently. Coup d’états have destabilized Mali and Guinea-Bissau. Nigeria has seen a series of terrorist attacks. Toureg rebels have conquered northern Mali and declared independence. Cote d’Ivoire is still recovering from its civil war. Meanwhile, there are reports about drug trafficking, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, and a food crisis in the making.
No region in the world has more fragile states than West Africa. The region, which consists of the fifteen countries stretching from Senegal to Nigeria, exemplifies the problems of state building when surrounded by other fragile states. Pint-sized, expensive markets keep most countries isolated from the dynamic changes globalization is bringing elsewhere. The region’s aggregate GDP is roughly the same as Norway’s—despite having over fifty times more people. Although Ghana and Senegal have made significant political and/or economic gains in recent years, most of the other states have been rocked by war, ethnic or religious clashes, political unrest, famine, or serious economic dislocation at various times over the past two decades. (more…)
Nigeria’s Potential for Sectarian Conflict
Maps help explain Nigeria’s social divisions and potential for sectarian conflict.
The country has stark ethnic and religious divides:
The first map shows the country’s major ethnic groups. There are a number of major groups (Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo) and many more smaller groups not listed. The country has over 250 in all.
The second map shows the country’s main religious divide. The areas where Sharia (a relatively mild version) has been adopted are all Muslim. They are all in the north. The south is mainly Christian. (There are still many who practice some form of indigenous religion, especially in the southwest, but these are in the minority.)
Now see how development has been spread across the country:
In the first map, the female literacy rate by state is listed. In the second map, the vaccination rate by state is listed. The south has much higher figures for both. It is richer, has more access to schools and health clinics, and has much stronger international ties (which produces more remittances and more NGO assistance). Stark inequities breed resentment in the Muslim north.
Now one more map:
Nigeria’s political divide roughly corresponds to its religious divide. In the 2011 election, a Christian southerner, incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan, trounced his main rival, a Muslim, former military ruler Muhammadu Buhari, 59 to 32 percent. Jonathan did especially well in the southeast, receiving more than ninety-five percent of the vote in nine states, and more than ninety-eight percent in six. Meanwhile, every state in the Sharia belt gave a majority of its votes to Buhari; almost every other state massively rejected him. (A third candidate, another Muslim, Nuhu Ribadu, did well in a few states in the southwest and midsection, but received only 5.4 percent of the vote nationally.)
Although fairly contested, this election broke an unwritten rule agreed to by the country’s elites, making strife more likely. Whereas the presidency (which controls massive sums of money) was supposed to rotate between northerners and southerners, now southerners have enjoyed a long period of rule. Muslim leader Umaru Musa Yar’Adua was supposed to serve two terms as president, but died in office before serving his first term. Jonathan, the vice president at the time, replaced him, gaining significant advantages in the 2011 election.
As Frances Stewart has documented, the chance of sectarian strife is greatest when an identity group feels economically, politically, and culturally excluded at the same time. The election of a southern Christian has made many in the north now feel that they have been reduced to second class status in at least two of these three areas. Whereas previously the north felt that they were at least partners in the political realm (compensating for the known differences in the economic sphere), now they are more apt to feel socially excluded within their own country.
Terrorism is certainly not a product of this sentiment, but the seeds from which it sprouts can be laid by such feelings. Nigeria will have to find a way to reduce the economic divisions and make northerners feel more like partners in the country’s political system if it hopes to avoid greater strife in the future.
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Is Lagos next?
Cross-posted from Global Dashboard.
Although it is extremely hard to predict the actions of a terrorist group such as Boko Haram, Lagos, Nigeria’s commercial capital, may be a looming target.
The organization’s capacity and ambition have grown swiftly, probably due to assistance from extremist groups in the Maghreb, Somalia, or farther afield.
And, as I wrote in December,
The country’s weak institutions make it ill-prepared to deal with threats like this. It is unlikely to have the capacity to meet the challenge. Expect more attacks in the coming months.
According to Human Rights Watch, Boko Haram has killed 935 people since 2009 in 164 attacks, including more than 250 in the first weeks of this year. It has bombed churches, police stations, military facilities, banks, and beer parlors. It attacked the United Nations headquarters in Abuja in August.
Last Friday’s devastating attack on Kano, Nigeria’s second largest city, went well beyond what any analyst predicted it was capable of. The Financial Times reported:
Eyewitnesses said hundreds of Boko Haram operatives were involved in the raids on eight police, intelligence and government targets that lasted several hours.
The police discovered 10 car bombs and hundreds of other unexploded devices on Monday in Kano.
The group, loosely modeled on the Taliban, seems intent on provoking greater religious conflict in a deeply divided country. Its members even talk of overthrowing the state. As Shehu Sani, a civil society activist, said,
They will attack again. It’s now a war that’s going on.
President Goodluck Jonathan has called Boko Haram the greatest threat to Nigeria since the Biafra War in the late 1960s.
The group is benefitting at least indirectly from a deep sense of frustration among Muslims in the north at southern (Christian) domination of the central government at a time when it was assumed it was their turn to rule. The inability of the state to promote development in any form compounds the alienation.
Venturing deep into the south—as an attack on Lagos would require—may be difficult to accomplish. All the attacks so far have come in the north or middle of the country, places either predominantly or partially Muslim. But as the Kano attack indicates, the group has reached a new level of sophistication, which could allow it to go where it could not previously.
Lagos offers more Western targets and important government institutions than anyplace else. Attacking the former capital city would help Boko Haram demonstrate that it can strike anywhere it wants and that the southern led administration cannot govern the country, important goals for the group.
The stability of Nigeria matters. The country is the dominant power in West Africa. It is on track to become one of the world’s five most populated countries by 2050. It exports more than 2 million barrels of oil a day, and has vast gas reserves. It is an increasingly important emerging market, receiving an estimated $6.5 billion in foreign direct investment last year. It is expected to soon overtake South Africa to become the continent’s largest economy.
Reversing this ominous trend line will not be easy. It requires a mixture of political, developmental, and security measures, all executed effectively.
But this is probably well beyond the capacity of a government well known for its dysfunction. Right now, the Jonathan administration seems overwhelmed and unsure how to respond. The intelligence agencies and police have shown little indication that they are ready to protect the country. A number of captured suspects, including the one accused of orchestrating the Christmas Day bombing, have even escaped custody.
As John Campbell of the Council on Foreign Relations explains:
If the Jonathan government persists in dealing with Boko Haram as a security issue without acknowledging and addressing the political dimension to the insurrection, it is likely that the conflict will intensify. The impotence of the police, military and security services so far indicates that the Abuja government does not have the ability or resources to destroy Boko Haram. . . .
Money will not solve the Boko Haram problem, and a political settlement would require a restructuring of Nigerian politics that would be difficult for any presidential administration to achieve.
As an ex-resident of Lagos who cares for the future of the country I hope my analysis is wrong.
Photo courtesy of Pan-African News Wire File Photos.
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Boko Haram’s Christmas present to Nigeria
The radical Islamist group Boko Haram obviously does not like Christmas:
Five bombs exploded on Christmas Day at churches in Nigeria, one killing at least 27 people, raising fears that Islamist militant group Boko Haram – which claimed responsibility – is trying to ignite sectarian civil war.
Gun battles between security forces and the sect also killed at least 68 people in the last few days in northern Nigeria. Earlier this year, the Islamists struck the capital, Abuja, twice, including a suicide car bomb attack against the United Nations headquarters that killed 26 people.
Nigeria has stark ethnic and religious divisions and a history of Muslim-Christian violence. Such attacks are unlikely to improve matters.
Unfortunately, the country’s weak institutions make it ill-prepared to deal with threats like this. It is unlikely to have the capacity to meet the challenge. Expect more attacks in the coming months.
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