New Transition Paradigm Project: Discussion Paper

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Overview
This paper has been prepared for an expert workshop being held April 8-9, 2014 to discuss the outline of a new conceptual and operational framework aimed at improving outcomes in countries emerging from war or repression – one that focuses systematically on the value of inclusiveness in the political, socio-cultural, economic, and security spheres.

Fragile and conflict-affected states face a wide range of challenges, typically marked by exclusive and divisive practices; the absence of a widely accepted social covenant or social contract; and a deeply fragmented political identity. These dynamics produce ill effects that may include an authoritarian, self-serving government; narrow economic growth enriching only a small segment of the population; inter-communal violence; and systematic discrimination against certain segments of the population.

For such countries, a transition away from conflict or authoritarianism creates the opportunity for a paradigm shift. Transitions are the rare but critical junctures in history during which these states can – as this paper argues – transform their political dynamics and pursue a new national path marked by inclusive and cohesive practices; the adoption of an enduring social covenant and social contract; and an inclusive overarching political identity. These can contribute to responsive and accountable governance; pro-poor policies that generate economic growth and deliver widespread benefits; a security and rule-of-law system that works equally for everyone; and a social and cultural ethic that opposes violence and discrimination based on identity and beliefs.

The workshop for which this paper has been prepared is part of a larger IFIT ‘New Transition Paradigm’ project. The meeting’s insights and discussions will help to shape a future Inclusive Transitions Handbook, the aim of which is to assist civil society leaders, local policymakers and their respective international partners to design, advocate and apply inclusive policies in contexts of actual or pending transition. The workshop will reflect on the premise of inclusiveness as an organising principle for transitions. Participants will consider, among other things: the most significant structural objectives to promoting inclusive transitions; the tools available to domestic leaders to promote an inclusive state; the policies that have been attempted in practice and either worked or failed; and the international community’s role in advancing these issues.

The intention of this paper is to give structure and focus to the discussion of these issues, not to provide a fully elaborated theory or roadmap for transitions or to present the blueprint for the future handbook. A list of questions for discussion is included at the end of this paper.

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Introduction

When any country enters a transition out of war or dictatorship, its citizens are naturally full of hope, with high expectations that their leaders, economies and societies will change. Yet, too few transitions deliver as advertised. Egypt’s first elected president alienated many of his fellow citizens and was deposed in a coup d’état. Libya has struggled to maintain security amid tribal and ethnic divisions. New liberties in Burma have spawned religious conflict. Nepal has struggled for years to write a new constitution amid bitter disputes. The track records of Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are similarly fraught.

Twelve years ago, democracy expert Thomas Carothers argued in a seminal article, *The End of the Transition Paradigm*, that the international community’s response to transitions was too template-driven and based on questionable assumptions about how countries are likely to evolve. He asserted that reliance on these assumptions was producing bad policy and faulty conclusions about the nature of emerging regimes – few transitioned to liberal democracy; most ended up in a ‘grey zone.’ His piece sparked a significant debate among practitioners and academics. Yet, little has changed since its publication. If anything, his central arguments have been reinforced by subsequent experience.

The problem stems partly from the nature of the challenges facing many countries emerging from war or authoritarianism. These states today confront familiar challenges, but with new intensity. Ethnic, religious, geographical, clan, or ideological divisions often prevent the formation of stable regimes that are widely viewed as legitimate. Weak governments that cannot act capably and equitably encourage groups to fight for power on zero-sum terms. Conflict begets conflict, working in a vicious cycle that is hard to end. Economies suffer in the process, worsening the lives of the very people whose high hopes had ignited the transition in the first place.

In this paper and subsequent IFIT initiatives, we take up the challenge implied in Carothers’ injunction to develop new frameworks “and perhaps eventually a new paradigm of political change – one suited to the landscape of today, not the lingering hopes of an earlier era.” (Carothers, 2002) The paradigm presented here, which is based on an updated understanding of transition dynamics, focuses on ‘inclusiveness’ in the political, socio-cultural, economic, and security spheres. It argues that inclusiveness – defined as the prioritisation of actions aimed at increasing cohesion and integration in these spheres – is the most logical organising principle to help fragile and conflict-affected states start to overcome the group divisions, weak institutions, and low trust levels that plague them, especially during the first few years of transition. Inclusiveness should become the overarching priority that guides transition planning and policy. It is, in many cases, the only way for a fragile state to potentially make a permanent break with the threat of renewed conflict or repression.
Section 1: Challenges of Democratic and Post-Conflict Transition

A mixed record

Transitions are critical junctures in a country’s history immediately following the formal end of a repressive regime or civil war. They have the potential to enable a country to make considerable progress by restructuring its political, economic and socio-cultural framework in a way that is ordinarily impossible.

Between 1974 and 1991, more than thirty countries in southern Europe, South America, East Asia and Eastern Europe underwent transitions out of authoritarian rule. Political scientist Samuel Huntington described this period as the ‘third wave’ of democratisation. The study of political transitions eventually became a field of its own – ‘transitology’ – as scholars tried to identify the key ingredients and pathways of democratic consolidation from the experiences of states moving out of authoritarianism such as Spain, Brazil, Poland and South Korea.

After the end of the Cold War, interest in transitions grew. Although a series of regions and countries quickly descended into vicious civil wars (from the Balkans to West Africa to the Great Lakes region of Africa, as well as in individual cases like Somalia and Algeria), in Central America, southern Africa and countries like Lebanon and Angola longstanding civil wars came to a halt through peace agreements and political accords. An additional wave of authoritarian regimes ended in the 1990s and 2000s in places as diverse as Indonesia, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Iraq, Haiti, Nigeria, Togo, and more recently, Tunisia, Yemen and Libya. These events spurred further interest in peacebuilding, democracy promotion and state-building.

Yet, despite the enormous amount of money spent by the international community on different facets of transition over the past two decades, events on the ground have often been disappointing. Although there have been successful cases of both post-authoritarian transitions (Brazil, Indonesia and the Baltic states) and post-conflict transitions (El Salvador, Mozambique and Croatia) – all cases noteworthy for some of their attempts at inclusiveness – there are many more examples of failed or disappointing transitions.

Despite ending military rule, Pakistan is beset by serious economic problems, the social exclusion of large parts of its population, violence, secessionism, stark inequities and pitiful public services. Though Nigeria has held a number of elections since the restoration of civilian rule and is reaping tens of billions of dollars in oil revenue annually, it has also seen poverty rise, violent conflict spike and frustration against elite-dominated politics grow. Since the fall of Mubarak, Egypt has degenerated into exclusionary state-building, rising tensions between competing groups and a resurgence of military domination. Bosnia, Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan, and Mali, among others, have similarly suffered setbacks.

The size and complexity of the ambitions behind reform programs created by – or for – these transition countries is often a complicating factor. Too much is attempted too quickly – often at international urging – in what are highly complicated, and often
highly combustible environments. Under such circumstances, it would be a mistake to suppose that all good things – democracy, improvements in public services, rapid growth and so on – can be achieved without trade-offs. In Afghanistan, for instance, hundreds of development actors have sought to transform the country, introducing elections, building a new national army, establishing government institutions, reforming the economy and even seeking to overturn widely accepted societal norms – but with little coordination and no overarching strategy for what might work in the circumstances.

Rather than follow Carothers’ advice, and despite encouraging international declarations to the contrary, practice remains largely based on a number of assumptions that have little evidence to support them: elections by themselves do not necessarily lead to a deepening of democracy; long-standing group divisions do not necessarily dissipate quickly; institutions are not necessarily robust enough to play an effective mediating role in politics and the economy; change does not necessarily have to start at the national level; the adoption of a liberal economic policy regime does not necessarily produce better economic outcomes; and important goals are not necessarily compatible, especially in the short term when difficult trade-offs must often be weighed. A more realistic assessment of the starting conditions of transition states would be a good basis for making improvements.

The nature of fragile and conflict-affected states

Transitions are outsized opportunities for countries to change their trajectories and move onto a new national path. At the same time, they test states by creating power vacuums and unleashing societies’ emotions with unparalleled force. Groups competing to advance their ideas about how the state should be organised surge in importance just when formal institutions are least able to handle the stress. As a result, transitions often highlight that underlying structural or ‘starting’ conditions are more important factors than political will in explaining outcomes. As Seymour Martin Lipset noted long ago, a coherent state – perhaps the most basic ‘starting condition’ of all – is a sine qua non for any hope of a successful democratic transition (Lipset, 1959).

Transitions bring into stark relief the differences between fragile and conflict-affected states (hereafter simply ‘fragile states’) and resilient ones (Kaplan, 2014b). Whereas resilient states can rely on strong social bonds, trust and a set of informal institutions that establish how to work together despite differences of opinion, fragile states cannot. As a result, the forces unleashed by a transition bring a society in a resilient state together, while pushing a society in a fragile state apart. Resilient states can work even when their governments fall. Leaders come together to settle disputes in a way that builds trust, strengthens ties and leads to the establishment of a new and widely acceptable political order. In fragile states, the reverse is often true. During transitions, leaders compete in ways that undermine trust, weaken ties among them and yield an unstable political order with low legitimacy.
In almost all cases, outside assistance can make a difference. Where institutions work well, the task is more straightforward. But where social divisions infect bureaucracies and courts, the challenge is much greater. Each country, inevitably, needs an approach tailored to its unique history, make-up, fault lines and economic potential. Yet, all fragile states call for a coherent approach that peers beyond the governance indicators and crises of the day to deal with the challenges of transitions. An overarching vision of inclusiveness can offer such an approach.

**Systemic challenges of transitions**

Although every transition and context is different, certain challenges that reflect deeply rooted problems exist across post-authoritarian and post-conflict contexts.

The end of a war or dictatorship creates a power vacuum in which many factions compete for advantage at a time when a country’s institutions are least able to manage such competition. Governments that were once viewed as ‘strong’ (such as Iraq or the Soviet Union) break down, and into this space step myriad identity- and ideology-based groups, at times armed, seeking control of the state to advance their own agenda and interests. They can include some of the forces of the old order that actively seek to undermine the new order, as well as others that simply utilise the chaos for criminal activities or personal gain.

In such circumstances, countries must overcome a recurrent and intertwined series of challenges that vary more in degree than in kind:

**Tenuous political settlements**: The forces that come to power during a transition typically rely on an initial agreement, explicit or implicit, that binds the major actors together. The settlement may take the form of a negotiated peace accord (e.g., Guatemala’s comprehensive peace accord) or political accord (e.g., Spain’s Moncloa Pact). Alternatively, it may exist more informally and arise more unilaterally – whether from the outside (e.g., the external intervention in Kosovo), above (e.g., the internally ‘managed’ transition in Burma) or below (e.g., the popular revolt in Ukraine in 2004).

Whatever its origin or form, the initial political settlement is usually weakly binding and excludes important groups, making it difficult for a new or interim regime to organise itself, gain legitimacy and maintain support. Political parties tend to be weak, and there is not usually a tradition of multiparty politics (Schmitter, 2010). Disputes arise that are not easy to resolve without the benefit of an agreed overarching political framework.

**Weak institutions**: When a transition begins, state institutions often turn out to be virtually non-existent (as in Somalia, Timor-Leste and Libya) or merely Potemkin structures built around patronage networks (as in Nigeria and Yemen). This can have various consequences. Political settlements can come apart because no independent organisation can enforce agreements. Since no actor can ensure that everyone plays by the rules, elections can be violent and corrupt, undermining their legitimacy. Economies can suffer because courts are rigged, regulators remain hostage to elites
and officials sell themselves to the highest bidder. A vicious cycle can develop – one in which low trust among different groups and actors leads to actions (such as broken agreements) that undermine institutions that in turn lead to even lower trust levels. These divisions in turn make arduous the formation of new apolitical state bodies capable of distributing public services and applying the law evenly, and the absence of these bodies further sharpens the divisions.

**Low social cohesion:** Many transitional states are postcolonial, with little national history behind them. They suffer from both limited legitimacy in their current forms and low solidarity among their diverse populations. Divisions may arise over conflicting ideas about the role of religion, the socio-economic model that ought to be adopted and which group should assume what position in the state’s hierarchy. A lack of trust among competing actors can encourage groups to revert to their subnational or supranational identities, undermining what limited social glue had previously been in place. Sectarian appeals can escalate, with potentially tragic consequences. Well-organised groups, including extremist and armed factions, have a strong advantage in such circumstances, even if they are few in numbers.

**The weight of history:** Old mind-sets and conflicts acquire new salience in transitions. This can be observed in everything from the first elections of new democracies (e.g., the resurrection of a Shia/Sunni divide in Iraq after the removal of the Ba’ath party) to the victor’s justice that can follow the end of civil wars (e.g., a decade of war crimes prosecutions in Croatia that targeted only ethnic Serbs). Because public support can rapidly turn to disillusionment in the earliest stages of a transition, nostalgia for the old order – when there was often less crime and chaos – can settle in. This often facilitates the rise of populist and authoritarian leaders who are all-too-willing to exploit national divides at the expense of longer-term national interests and human rights. Unsettled internal or external borders (often as a result of colonialism) can trigger conflict with neighbours or drive secessionist tendencies by groups suddenly able, legitimately or otherwise, to claim self-determination or demand autonomy from a weakened state.

**Persistent violence:** Mass organised violence, endemic under circumstances of dictatorship or conflict, may recede in a transitional period, only to be replaced by a rise in crime and more ad hoc forms of terror or political violence. Radicals who stand the most to lose in the new era may use violence and blackmail to gain, or regain, power and influence. Fragile political settlements and power vacuums compound the structural incentives for such violence, which in turn compound existing societal divisions and expose state security limits (as in Libya). Even when violence is statistically on the decline, the gap between expected and real peace dividends can produce the perception of a failing transition and lead to calls for extreme responses that, if acted upon, could spur a downward spiral. Even the pace of reforms – too quick or too slow – can exacerbate violence (World Bank, 2011).

**Economic malaise:** Economic conditions frequently play a crucial role in igniting the public anger that sparks a transition but prove difficult to improve once the transition gets underway. The legacy of a weak economic and educational foundation leaves countries and populations unprepared to compete internationally. Unemployment
will often rise and stay high, even as new businesses emerge. Budget deficits may widen, forcing governments to cut public services or refrain from much-needed public spending. Meanwhile, instability can reduce business investment, decreasing job opportunities. This can produce frustration and lead many people to see no improvement—or worse—for many years. The whole process feeds upon itself in a vicious cycle that is hard to escape, producing ever-greater anger. Unemployed youth may stray toward crime or extremism.

**Clashing priorities:** Periods following war or dictatorship require an ability to work in two modes at once: crisis management and long-term planning. Transitions are not static moments in which leaders can plan and act in relative calm. To manage a transition is to operate in a constant state of urgency, requiring continuous creativity and rapid decisions. Yet, different groups – especially those based on ideological or sectarian identities – will find compromise hard. Even among the more like-minded, clashing views easily arise over the relative priority of democracy and stability, political and economic reform and so on. In the absence of a shared long-term vision, a transition can look and feel directionless, lurching from crisis to crisis as the forces of disorder and resistance make the biggest headlines.

**Hollow non-state sectors:** Local civil society often plays a key role in overturning dictators or ending civil wars. But the transitional period that follows may reveal activist groups, trade unions and social movements to be weakly organised, divided into competing factions or lacking the capacity to influence politics. In extreme cases, civil society is too weak to hold leaders accountable, contributing to a surge in corruption and clientelism (Cwiek-Karpowicz and Kaczyński, 2006). The private sector’s weaknesses may also be revealed: in the absence of a political patron to dole out special concessions, key industrialists may be exposed as former cronies unable to operate profitably in an open global economy. Similarly, the media may turn out to lack the independence and professionalism necessary to act, even minimally, as an effective fourth estate in the crucial early years of a transition.

**International disorganisation:** Since the end of the Cold War, international development actors (especially bilateral donors, multilateral agencies and international NGOs) have become a significant source of assistance and influence in almost every transition. The agglomeration of actors has grown so much that its size and complexity can easily overwhelm weak states already facing an immense number of challenges and priorities. The result is added confusion and frustration among national policymakers and civil society leaders that can further threaten the transition and provoke a backlash against foreign assistance. This can block valuable international support from reaching key actors. The phenomenon of a “closing space” (for democracy and human rights support) is already a reality in countries like Russia and Egypt.

**The underlying opportunity**

The immensity of these challenges reflects the size of the opportunity for transformation that transitions provide. Transitions, implicitly, offer fresh hope as
the chance to establish a new order arises. Yet, the longer these moments lack clarity or direction, the less confident the public feels and the more active the spoilers become.

As the next section explains, there is a productive way forward. Through an approach centred on ‘inclusiveness’, countries can veer onto a better national path. They can leverage the critical juncture that a transition represents (the triggers and exact features of which will vary) in order to change the divisive and exclusive dynamics that dominated in the past.
Section 2: The Inclusiveness Paradigm

A new approach

Transitions in fragile states require new ideas and practices if better results are to be achieved. They need a channelling principle that can focus the efforts of a wide range of actors and help countries prioritise the many challenges they face. Inclusiveness can potentially offer this – and more. By setting an overarching vision and tone, it can work to directly heal the fault lines that plague transition countries, while building up the trust and cohesion necessary to get through a period marked by crises. Inclusiveness can also act as a compass that steers elites and the public to build a common identity and vision (Kaplan, 2013). As such, the inclusiveness paradigm – a new approach put forth by the authors of this paper – has the potential to affect the discourse around transitions in ways that increase the chance of more positive outcomes.

In its maximal or ideal form, inclusiveness should seek to make ethnic, religious and ideological groups – as well as poorer and historically excluded groups – feel that they are an integral part of the country and a key player in shaping a national identity and destiny. It should ensure that major decisions are based on an inclusive – or at least “inclusive enough” - process that is widely seen as legitimate. It should involve asking all segments of a society to equitably share the burdens of necessary sacrifices, while working hard to ensure that everyone has access to emerging opportunities. It implies, in short, trying to identify and elevate the points that unite rather than divide key ethnic, class, religious and ideological groupings. Change will not be easy – indeed, history suggests that it takes a long time to transform an exclusive regime and political culture – but transitional decision-makers who exhibit leadership and a commitment to inclusiveness can do a lot to set a country on the right political, economic and social track.

Making inclusiveness the leading priority is both ethical and practical. Inclusiveness can be both a short-term source of resilience when national institutions are slow to deliver results and passions are running especially high, and a long-term bedrock as national capacity improves. It can provide a crucial cushion against political backlash or the inflaming of group tensions at a time when policy results cannot be ensured. In various environments, it can help overcome hard-to-control factors such as geography and the regional and international environment (Dahl, 1989).

The missing link

Global scholarship and some aspects of policy have been moving in the direction of inclusiveness. Terms like ‘inclusive political settlement’ and ‘inclusive growth’ feature increasingly in literature and declarations about transitions (e.g., New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States; 2011 World Development Report; the United Nations’ Post-2015 Development Agenda). The concept of ‘inclusive democracy’ has been developed, and the terms ‘social inclusion’ has long been in use. Literature on trust,
reconciliation, social capital, citizenship, coexistence, multiculturalism and anti-racism also abounds.

Yet, only some of these concepts are linked directly to the importance of the transitional moment (e.g., reconciliation and coexistence). Others are more in the nature of an intended outcome than a method or an approach (e.g., trust and citizenship). Some emphasise the political, economic or socio-cultural dimensions of inclusiveness rather than something more all-encompassing (e.g., inclusive political settlement, inclusive growth, inclusive democracy, multiculturalism). Here, we unite these important but incomplete strands.

Inclusiveness, in the sense described here, is as much a method as an intended result; as much a normative principle as a metric for evaluating progress. It is a term that, unlike so many others, lacks religious baggage or Western origins. If anything, it is more heavily emphasised in East Asia, where countries tend to strongly value social cohesion. The term is immediately familiar anywhere, without being imposing. It surpasses the idea of treating minorities well or giving greater autonomy to breakaway populations; it goes beyond the idea of elite pacts and accepted rules of the game; it is contingent on neither a homogeneous or heterogeneous population, nor a wealthy or impoverished one; and it complements (and partly transcends) the realm of human rights, which is founded on the rights that groups and individuals have against the state, but not the consideration they need to have in relation to each other. Inclusiveness is the missing link in the transition puzzle and the logical extension of several key ideas increasingly in play.

The look of inclusiveness

As historical inflection points, transitions offer the logical springboard for switching paths: away from the exclusive and divisive and toward the inclusive and cohesive. Although it is arguably a value worth pursuing at any time, in transitions – when the risk of renewed violence is unusually high and, paradoxically, the opportunity of preventing it most present – inclusiveness takes on special importance.

As the diagram below indicates, inclusiveness requires an integrated approach that identifies a fragile state’s most corrosive economic, political, security and socio-cultural dynamics and then focuses on overcoming their effects.
When political and social leaders espouse an inclusive vision and back it up with action, their rhetoric and deeds resonate far and wide, with positive consequences for every aspect of a transition. Inclusiveness reinforces political settlements, stabilises and strengthens government, reduces the chance that violence will erupt and builds confidence and trust across a society (Przeworski, 1995). As such, it can impact not only the tangible aspects of a transition – including political processes and economic reforms – but also on the crucially important but rarely emphasised intangible aspects. The more people are optimistic about the country’s path and their own futures, the more likely they are to accept the short-term difficulties and setbacks that will inevitably appear.

In inclusive societies, elites demonstrate a sense of political, moral, psychological, or social obligation to others, including those from different ethnic, class, religious, and ideological groups (Kaplan, 2013). This sense – often slow in coming at first – can become strong enough to inspire elites to make the difficult compromises necessary for a transition to succeed (as happened for example during the transitions in Spain, Chile, South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Indonesia after many years of exclusionary practices) and to accept election outcomes and government decisions they may disagree with. It also translates into more support for policies that benefit everyone (such as improving government institutions and investing in infrastructure) or that are more targeted to those historically excluded (such as programs to improve
smallholder farms and regional economic imbalances). The roots of this readiness among elites to extend opportunities to everyone can usually be found in a shared sense of identity (whether cultural, ideological, religious or ethnic) or in some other form of intellectual, spiritual, or physical kinship. Effective institutions that serve people equitably can intensify this sense of national attachment or compensate for its absence. Both of these require a lot of time to develop - making inclusive action on the part of leaders that much more essential during transitions.

In exclusionary societies, by contrast, elites have little affinity for people from other ethnic, religious, class and ideological groups and instead see them mainly as obstacles to achieving their own objectives. This attitude enables elites to justify their continued subjugation of or indifference to other members of society. Exclusionary societies are most likely to be found in countries with deep social fissures based on ethnicity, religion, class, caste, or clan and a long history of elite-dominated political and economic systems. Exclusionary tendencies are reinforced when ineffective institutions cannot hold leaders accountable or prevent the rich and powerful from corrupting the state.

Compare, for example, Tunisia’s, Egypt’s, and Syria’s experiences in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Even though Tunisia has faced many economic and security problems since the fall of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, opposition forces are still working together peacefully, if not always agreeably. Major political forces came together quickly—or as political scientist Alfred Stepan argued, well before the uprising—to work on the transition (Stepan, 2012). The country had good starting conditions: it is relatively cohesive and boasts a strong sense of nationhood and a modern and professional middle class. Its government may be bureaucratic and slow, but it works. The military initially protected the old regime, but it was quick to turn against it and to pledge to stay out of politics after the transition began. With a new constitution in place that has been hailed by Islamists and liberals alike as a model of compromise, Tunisia’s leaders’ inclusive-minded actions have greatly increased the chance that their transition will foster a widely-accepted political order.

In Egypt, by contrast, first the Muslim Brotherhood and then the military sought to systemically exclude political rivals from any role in shaping the country’s direction. Following protests against elected President Mohammad Morsi’s decision in November 2012 to grant himself new sweeping powers, the Brotherhood attempted to steamroll past its opposition by putting to popular vote an Islamic-leaning constitutional draft that enforced a rigid concept of Egypt’s national identity. A year later, the military established a 50-member panel to draft its own amendments of the Mubarak-era constitution – a panel that excluded the Islamists, with the exception of the Salafist Nour Party that backed the army’s overthrow of Morsi. Moreover, after the army regained political control in a coup, it cracked down on opponents, overseeing the repression, jailing and use of lethal force against supporters of the Brotherhood (and other opponents). Ultimately, neither group sought to build an inclusive political dialogue that would bring together the country’s disparate forces; instead, they opted to create facts on the ground, and ignore dissenting voices. The
economy suffered from the instability, and much-needed reforms were indefinitely postponed.

In Syria, where vicious state repression of peaceful protest prevented a negotiated transition and unleashed a civil war, opposition forces have been unable to cooperate. The country had unfavourable starting conditions: it is deeply divided along sectarian and ideological lines; has a weak sense of nationhood; struggles with poor economic conditions; is situated next to other fragile states; has little exposure to democratic norms of governance; and has a history of coups d'états and exclusionary government. The current regime has exploited the divisions to its advantage in order to retain control of a significant part of the country, garnering support by playing on minority fears of an increasingly radicalised Sunni opposition. Though the regime has been able to orchestrate reliable support from Alawites, and at times from segments of the Sunni business class and Christians, neutrality from the Druze, and occasional logistical help from the main Kurdish party, its long history of excluding many of these same groups (in addition to the Sunni majority and rural poor) is coming back to haunt it. The regime's narrative states that its forces are protecting minority groups against Sunni 'terrorists' (i.e. the armed opposition); but however much exploiting this version of events helps it survive in the short term, it is unlikely to ever be able to produce a stable regime, let alone definitively win the war.
Section 3: Putting the Paradigm into Practice

Institutionalisation of the state

The concept of inclusiveness rests on two pillars capable of uniting the leaders of various factions behind a common political vision, building a national identity that can bind diverse peoples and creating a government accountable to its population. These pillars are a social covenant and a social contract (Kaplan, 2014a).

Before describing these, however, it is important to note the centrality of a related goal: institutionalisation of the state (Kaplan, 2013). This is an essential long-term objective, and depends, as Samuel Huntington wrote almost half a century ago, upon substantial efforts to develop the “political organizations and procedures” (including political parties, the rules guiding the choice of leaders, the rule of law, etc.) within it. The greater “the extent to which the political organizations and procedures encompass activity in the society” and are able by their “adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence” to respond to the needs of rapidly evolving societies, the more stable politics will be and the more leaders will be able to focus on working constructively with opponents, developing the economy and expanding public services.

Institutionalisation is needed to reduce conflict in the political arena (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2009). It is necessary to establish effective, large government ministries (such as those for agriculture and education) and sophisticated regulatory regimes (such as those overseeing business) capable of fostering and supporting an inclusive, dynamic economy. Institutionalisation is equally important to the establishment of large policy-based political parties, NGOs, and companies; ensuring the rule of law works equitably for everyone; and limiting the violence that is endemic in fragile states (World Bank, 2011).

Yet, in these states – defined by their governance failings and social divides – institutionalisation is inevitably a long-term process. And that is where transitions come into play. They offer these countries a chance to switch tracks and put in place the preconditions to enable institutionalisation in the future. A social covenant and a social contract can act as those preconditions. They can serve as the binding mechanisms of an inclusive transition process – the success or failure of which will either enable or impede the institutionalisation of the state.

The two pillars of inclusiveness: the social covenant and social contract

Although both social covenants and social contracts are important – and may form through a variety of processes, only some of which are formally arranged (such as a national dialogue and a constitutive assembly) – they serve different purposes. As Jonathan Sacks explains:

Social contract creates a state; social covenant creates a society. Social contract is about power and how it is to be handled within a political
framework. Social covenant is about how people live together despite their differences. Social contract is about government. Social covenant is about coexistence. Social contract is about laws and their enforcement. Social covenant is about the values we share. Social contract is about the use of potentially coercive force. Social covenant is about moral commitments, the values we share and the ideals that inspire us to work together for the sake of the common good (Sacks, 2007).

Too often, international efforts to aid transitions in fragile states fail because they emphasise the importance of the vertical state-society relationship and ‘social contract’ more than the factors shaping the horizontal dynamics within society that determine how the state-society relationship evolves and whether such a contract can even be fashioned. A better approach would address these latter challenges straight on, by developing a social covenant that brings together various ethnic, religious, clan and ideological groups before or in conjunction with efforts to build a robust social contract.

Forged from negotiations among different groups (and thus more akin to a society-society compact than a state-society compact), social covenants build common identity, common values, and a common sense of purpose for the state. They define the origins and makeup of political society and thus concern society building, fashioned with the understanding that a cohesive society is a precondition to a successful state. As most successful transitions show, a society that is able to reach agreement on its fundamental principles and values (e.g., who is a citizen and what makes for a legitimate government) is much better equipped to forge a sustainable social contract than one divided by stark fault lines, especially when institutions are weak and unable to enforce rules and commitments.

Social covenants are crucial to building legitimate political orders in fragile states, because such countries lack a common national identity and have populations with stark differences in loyalties, values, and priorities. If the most important groups within society do not come together to reach a social covenant that builds consensus on how they will cooperate and what common vision will shape the nature of the state they share, the social contract will remain out of reach. As Michael Hudson explained in his classic study of the “legitimacy shortage” in Arab politics, “If the population within given political boundaries is so deeply divided within itself on ethnic or class lines, or if the demands of a larger supranational community are compelling to some [significant] portion of it, then it is extremely difficult to develop a legitimate order.” (Hudson, 1977)

In societies riven by divisions and lacking any accepted arbiter such as the state, an agreement (even implicit) among major sectarian and ideological groups is crucial to ending conflict and dividing up power based on a common understanding of national identity and the nature of the state. Without a working agreement or its informal equivalent on these primordial issues, competitors are likely to view the chase after power and resources as a zero-sum game – with predictably dire effects.
Social contracts, which should set the stage for building an accountable and capable government, complement social covenants. In the best cases the two agreements complement and reinforce each other (Kaplan, 2014a). Building a nation goes hand-in-hand with building a state. A commitment to developing an inclusive, unified polity goes hand-in-hand with developing a robust rule of law and an equitable framework for determining how power will be distributed. Building social cohesion and a common identity go hand-in-hand with forming accountable, democratic government.

Inclusive logic

One of the biggest challenges to forging social covenants and contracts is determining whom to include and whom to exclude from the process. Although the ‘winners’ from any transition are generally reluctant or even loath to work with members (or partners) of the former regime, minority groups that played no prominent role in the changeover or former extremists who want to join the process, they should overcome their reluctance. In places such as Iraq and Libya, the shunning of members of the previous regime has weakened the capacity of the state; in Iraq, the shunning of members of the former dominant ethnic or tribal group has hardened social divisions and produced violence. Working with a set of principles and values that are widely shared across social divisions – and can be based on, for example, religion or a common cultural outlook – is essential if stark fault lines are to be overcome.

In Tunisia, something akin to a social covenant was constructed years before the Arab Spring. The four major opposition political parties came together in 2003 to reach a consensus on the fundamental principles regarding how the country would be governed if they came to power. In the ‘Call from Tunis,’ they agreed on the role of elections, religion, Muslim-Arab values, women in society and other similar matters. Starting in 2005, these parties and smaller ones met to reaffirm their commitment to the principles and worked to reach a consensus on the details of their implementation (Stepan, 2012). These agreements and the relationships built during this time have enabled Islamic and secular leaders to work through much of their mutual fear and distrust. They laid the groundwork for the encouraging, if still imperfect, transition that began in the country in 2011. Although negotiations over the constitution—the social contract—proved difficult, eventual agreement was reached in no small part because of the social covenant.

Egypt, by contrast, despite starting with a relatively cohesive and institutionalised state, has done remarkably little to develop a unified political society, build trust among its major factions or create a consensus about what the country’s identity and fundamental guiding principles ought to be. As noted earlier, its post-Arab Spring governments have acted exclusively, seeking to steamroll opponents rather than include them. The result is more conflict than necessary and a process that is deemed illegitimate by many, even if a majority of the population voted for the country’s first elected president and now appears to support the military regime that toppled him.
The rest of the region, including ongoing or interrupted transitions in places like Yemen, Bahrain, and Iraq, suffers from similar problems.

**A supporting national narrative**

Combined, social covenants and contracts offer a broader and more comprehensive approach than focusing on either elite bargains or the quest for ‘inclusive enough politics and processes.’ Together they address a much broader set of issues than a focus on process and politics alone. But to work best, the contract and covenant need to be more than just a set of accords. They must be backed by an overarching narrative that reinforces them, framing in layperson terms how the society sees itself, how it got to where it is and how it envisions the future.

The narrative, which may include a new national motto and heroes, can shape both public opinion and the actions of leaders during a transition. If systematically reinforced over a long time horizon by a wide range of actors – and in various arenas such as schools and the media – the narrative can contribute to the practical realisation of inclusiveness. A new national narrative provides the story line that helps direct people to think, act and talk inclusively, creating a virtuous cycle whereby inclusiveness reinforces itself.

When communicated strategically, a new national narrative around inclusive coexistence can disrupt dominant collective myths, codes and stereotypes related to supposed group characteristics and real or imagined past events. Such codes cannot be left unchallenged in a transitional period, because they are so often the basis for justifying renewed violence and intolerance, both of which can quickly threaten any transition.

Challenging ingrained myths, however, is never enough. New and inclusive collective narratives must be created to replace, over time, the old ones. The reason is evident: it can be hugely destabilising to undo longstanding narratives, as they have long internalised and formed individual and group identities (e.g., being a member of a group that is ‘always a victim/aggressor’ and ‘never/always targets others’). The ability to live without these ‘truths’ can only happen if there is a new narrative. Otherwise, one of two things can easily happen: a backlash can arise (e.g., by those who are threatened by the idea that their ethnic or racial groups were not just victims, but also perpetrators); or the hold of the destructive narrative can deepen and thus compound fears and mistrust among groups. These are the very things that a transition cannot afford, but for which inclusiveness can offer a response.

The narrative itself can take any number of forms. It can be linked to an external anchor (e.g., ‘European-ness’ for potential EU candidates) or a foreign example (e.g., the ‘Turkish model’ for some Muslim-majority democracies) or build upon some aspect of national history (e.g., Egypt could build on its long history as a diverse, unified state and centre of learning). What matters is that a narrative exists and connects, implicitly or explicitly, with an inclusive social covenant and contract. As the 2011 World Development Report states: “Common to successful leadership,
whether individual or collective, is this ability to redefine citizen and elite expectations, to move them beyond negative frames of reference, and to transform public policies and institutions in ways that will enable the state to address immediate and long-term sources of discord" (World Bank, 2011).

The South African success story: How did they do it?

South Africa is perhaps best recent example of how the “covenant plus contract” approach can work in practice. Despite being riven by the long history of apartheid and conflict, it managed one of the most successful contemporary transitions, providing a template for how such periods can be managed in other deeply-splintered societies (Kaplan, 2014a). The weaknesses of South Africa’s democracy today do not take away anything from the momentous nation-building it accomplished two decades ago.

The 1991–1992 Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) brought together most major actors in an attempt to broker an agreement to begin a national transition. Although this failed, it nurtured the relationships that set the stage for the 1992 Record of Understanding between the most important representatives of whites, the National Party (NP), and blacks, the African National Congress (ANC). The accord detailed their agreement on matters such as a constitutional assembly, an interim government, political prisoners, dangerous weapons and mass action, and helped revive the negotiation process. The NP and the ANC then worked to reach bilateral consensus on these issues before taking them to the other parties, which by this time (April 1993) were all engaged in the negotiation process to end apartheid. Finally, with international assistance to overcome some brinkmanship, the major societal groups reached an agreement.

This final agreement, akin to the social covenant, forced everyone to make concessions and led to an interim constitution. The ANC got what it wanted – the transfer of power – in return for protections for groups that feared a long period of one-party dominance. The NP was promised a role in government for five years as part of the ruling coalition after the first universal-suffrage election, held in 1994. The capitalist economy and the role of private property were maintained, ensuring that white assets would not be seized, as was widely feared. Decentralisation gave the mainly Zulu Inkatha Freedom Party, whites and other groups, greater access to power at the provincial level. The Zulu monarchy was given special status. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established to deal with politically-motivated crimes committed during the apartheid era in a way that respected the amnesty bargain that was a precondition for the transfer of power. The constitution – the formal social contract that would guide the relationship between state and society – was drawn up by the parliament elected in 1994 and promulgated in 1996. It had to include a collection of ‘constitutional principles’ that were agreed upon during the pre-transition negotiations.

With Nelson Mandela, leader of the ANC, playing a crucial role before, during and after the process, the country avoided a bloodbath among conflicting groups and
established a new national narrative and identity that brought people together. South Africa’s new democratic leaders used the famous moniker ‘rainbow nation’ to describe the kind of demographic the country already had, but also the kind of society it should aspire to become in a new era. The term signalled to all of the country’s racial and ethnic groups that they were important to the country’s future. The rainbow nation idea was reinforced by Africa’s most robust state institutions, which worked well enough to ensure fair implementation of the agreements.

Of course, few countries boast an inclusive leader like Mandela, or a public so largely willing to support an inclusive approach. Instead, many countries have fallen victim to the steep odds stacked against the inclusive approach. In new democracies in divided societies, inclusive-minded candidates often have trouble competing at the polls with candidates who appeal to a specific demographic. In Egypt’s last presidential election, for instance, the candidates with relatively more inclusive platforms and ideologies lost, leaving the run-off contest to two of the most polarising candidates: Mohammad Morsi and Ahmed Shafik.

But South Africa showed, and Tunisia may, too, that transitions can move forward when leaders of various factions accept and promote the need for inclusiveness and compromise. It is surely not coincidence that Tunisia is today the only Arab Spring country seemingly on its way to a successful transition. The country’s achievements – including a peaceful handover of power by the Islamist Nahda party and the new consensus constitution – demonstrate that, as in the case of South Africa twenty years earlier, wise leaders of transition countries hoping to consolidate their gains ground public policy on inclusiveness.
Section 4: Obstacles to Implementation

Structural disincentives to inclusiveness

Inclusiveness is the right path for a country hoping to make the most of its transition – but the path is anything but straightforward. Numerous limitations and challenges must be overcome – not least political violence, weak institutions, economic weakness, and social division – in order to forge and maintain an inclusive social covenant and contract (Kaplan, 2013). As is the case with any new idea, the challenge is not merely one of agreement on an ideal, but also of practical implementation. Even if all major actors agree in principle on the need for inclusiveness, change will usually take a long time and require persistent effort on many fronts. Trade-offs must be handled in a way that is seen as fair and promoting national goals that will benefit everyone over the long-term even if, in the short term, many have to sacrifice and not all can be included in the coalition that comes to power or in the gains from the economy.

A particularly big impediment to inclusiveness is structural. Leaders – including politicians, various officials, important business figures and the heads of religious and community groups – who want to promote inclusiveness and put the national interest above sectarian or individual needs must often work against the grain of how society operates. Incentives for behaviour in such places are more often than not oriented in ways that encourage exclusiveness (and corruption). In many cases – whether in Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan or Syria – exclusionary regimes endure precisely because they are based on a strategy of rewarding loyalty to a core group of supporters while excluding everyone else.

Leaders may believe they have an obligation, both practical and ethical, to prioritise the interests of their own ethnic group, religious denomination, clan and other group with which they are strongly associated over the interests of the state as a whole. In a socially divided country with weak institutions, personal relationships typically predominate over any state-mandated laws. New leaders emerging in the transition period may feel justified in using state resources to reward members of their group at the expense of everyone else, no matter how corrupt and self-serving it may appear. Governments in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, build more schools and hospitals in areas where the local population belongs to the same ethnic group as the leadership.

Such leaders and officials face a political and economic calculus very different from that encountered by their peers in the rich world. A weak transitional government incapable of enforcing the rule of law and easily co-opted by wealthy and powerful forces creates a difficult environment for progressive-minded individuals, often forcing them to make uncomfortable choices simply to survive politically. Officials who break the law in wealthy countries, by contrast, typically risk a great deal for relatively little reward. Besides getting fired and jailed, most convicted white-collar criminals are also ostracised by their friends and family. In many fragile states, the reverse is true. Officials who break the law can reap considerable rewards without facing significant risks. Corruption is so ubiquitous that an individual who refuses to
participate in it may be abiding by the letter of the law but is certainly flouting convention. That person may even antagonise relatives, friends and superiors – everyone, indeed, who stands to benefit from the corrupt status quo.

Inclusiveness will thus run counter to the self-interests of many people, especially in a transition, when a great deal of power and wealth is suddenly up for grabs. The good news is that these political cultures can be changed. Every country’s elite has individuals who want to encourage their states to become more inclusive, with the increased stability and economic growth that such an approach promises. These forward-looking individuals can forge a coalition of like-minded individuals and groups to promote a mechanism, such as the combined social covenant and contract, to prod other members of the elite to support inclusive state-building measures. The aim is to gradually build an “inclusive enough” coalition capable of bringing about change in how a country operates (World Bank, 2011). The more cohesive a population can become, the more likely that its leaders will see an inclusive agenda as being in their own interests. By corollary, the more committed to inclusion elites are, the more likely a population will become cohesive over time. What is missing – and what will be the subject of a future IFIT handbook – is the set of tools and tactics that can support inclusive-minded leaders and others to build this agenda when the moment of transition is upon them.

**Spoilers in the midst**

In any transition or attempt to shift to a more inclusive approach, there will inevitably be individuals and groups who act as spoilers. Their interests, relationships, or worldviews are threatened, and they may work to stymie change. Unfortunately, it may be difficult at times to discern which groups and individuals should be brought into the process and which should be excluded. In Tunisia, for example, a reluctance to take proper security measures against a radical Islamist movement came back to haunt the first post-transition elected government, when extremists attacked police, soldiers and the U.S. embassy in Tunis and assassinated two secular opposition politicians in 2013.

Given this context, it is important to clarify whom inclusiveness does not encompass:

**Violent radicals:** In every society there is a fringe, however small, that will resort to extreme measures to oppose the move to a more inclusive social contract and covenant. These are the absolute rejectionists, the individuals and groups in society who may be prepared to turn to violence, such as the Real IRA in Northern Ireland or Ansar al-Shariah in Tunisia. An inclusiveness paradigm does not hold that such groups should be handled leniently. Impartial mechanisms to deal with illegal violence – laws, police, prosecutors, courts and prisons – may need to be strengthened in the first period of a transition to deal with new insecurity or chaos. If at a later stage, violent radicals become prepared to pursue their goals through non-violent and democratic means, society may consider it best to include a place for them, as Colombia is currently exploring with the FARC. But transition leaders must respond strongly to organised threats or acts of politically-motivated violence. Radical violent
groups should be handled through legal means, while the rest of society gets on with its new inclusive agenda.

*Exclusionary democrats:* It is difficult to prevent groups that narrowly win elections from going on to rule in exclusionary ways, as did the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Shiite government in Iraq. Such actions aggravate societal tensions and undermine the very democracy that brought them to power. Powerful extremist forces and external actors can also pressure governments to exclude certain groups. In Libya, for example, militias pressured parliament to pass a law that banned senior Qaddafi-era officials from working in government. In Bahrain, Saudi Arabia has often obstructed any attempt to create a regime more inclusive of Shiites. These kinds of tactics must meet a robust response from inclusive-minded leaders.

Introducing constitutional and electoral rules that lock in coalitions, force political parties to appeal across identity groups and geographies and preclude any group from imposing its will on large policy issues (such as language rights, state budgets, and religion) prevent simple majorities from dominating everyone else. Creative use of decentralisation where identity groups are geographically separated (such as in India, where states are often based on language groups) can also alleviate problems at the centre.

*Secessionists:* Although the inclusiveness paradigm does not exclude the legitimate pursuit of secessionist self-determination quests, it generally discourages them – either directly and explicitly, or indirectly and implicitly by the promotion of an inclusive national ideology. Both India and Indonesia – despite their immense diversity – have built largely cohesive national identities through a combination of leadership, decentralisation, compromise and democracy. Neither is perfect, and both have suffered from secessionist wars and poor governance, but their generally inclusive governance has compensated for weaknesses elsewhere.

Self-determination claims tend to arise precisely because of the absence of a serious or creative effort at inclusiveness, or worse, the continuity of exclusionary policies that may have originated with badly drawn borders that forced groups with no common history or culture to coexist. Bangladeshis seceded from Pakistan because they felt that the country’s elite, which was almost exclusively from outside their territory (in what is now Pakistan), was trampling on their rights. Minority ethnic groups have fought secessionist wars against the Burman-dominated central government in Myanmar for over half a century because the latter has consistently excluded them from positions of power. Of course, even a relatively inclusive state such as Canada or Spain that makes ample use of federalism or other forms of political decentralisation may have to confront claims for self-determination, as in Quebec and Catalonia. Thus, inclusiveness cannot offer guarantees, but only probabilities of greater national unity.

Inclusiveness also does not imply or require the creation of deep empathy among, or within, disparate subnational groups. It is enough in a transition to foster the minimum confidence or trust necessary for groups of citizens to consider committing to the national ‘we’ and not only an own-group version. For this to happen, public
policies should limit the degree to which subnational groupings (ethnic, religious, racial or otherwise) become legally or constitutionally reified or frozen, as though no one in the society ever married, had families or forged hybrid identities across group lines. This is not to say that inclusiveness should not accommodate minority rights and protections through law. The point is to avoid the too-early legalisation of identities in a fragile state that can foster a dangerous and enduring politicisation of identities (Przeworski, 1995), as has occurred in Lebanon and Bosnia partly due to the ways their constitutions handle sectarian identities.

War criminals: The question of how to deal with the perpetrators of international crimes and gross human rights violations from the period of dictatorship or war is one of a transition’s thornier issues. To some extent, the matter extends beyond the control of individual states, because of the transnational reach of foreign, regional, international, and hybrid courts. But what happens locally still matters most, and the inclusiveness paradigm has a lot to recommend here.

Despite what the term might imply, inclusiveness is not a synonym for reconciliation in the sense of ‘forgive and forget’. Instead, it is a term that offers a guiding objective for how to design and evaluate the quality and impact of a broad range of potential transitional justice measures. However, inclusiveness does imply a less central role for prosecutions, since there is no escaping the fact that “the language of criminal prosecutions is the language of political exclusion” (Schlunck, 2000). Trials quickly take on the look of picking sides when, however much warranted, the indicted are political figures of the old order.

The same cannot be said, however, for measures like truth commissions, victim reparations, institutional reforms and conditional amnesties. Applied in an integrated fashion, these ought to be if not substitutes for, at least a greater priority than, trials of political figures in the early years of a transition in a divided society. Arguably, these other approaches offer a wiser middle course, as seen in transitions such as those of Chile, Ghana, South Africa and Poland.

International interests: International players acting on their own interests often, deliberately or otherwise, stand in the way of inclusive transitions. In places like Syria and Lebanon, for instance, outside actors such as Iran and Saudi Arabia have supported certain identity groups at the expense of others, accentuating differences, making compromise problematic, and working against any effort to enhance social cohesion. In Iraq, the U.S.-led Coalition Provisional Authority’s ‘de-Ba’athification’ policy combined with severe security measures in Sunni neighbourhoods alienated Sunnis (Crisis Group report, 2013). This helped to accentuate existing social divisions, yielding a hard-to-change political framework that has facilitated a continuous stream of exclusionary policies in the country. Eleven years on, Sunnis remain systematically marginalised, and the violent Sunni insurgency that has developed in response is one of the principal spoilers of Iraq’s botched transition. In Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Afghanistan, neighbours have accentuated social divisions and weakened governance in the pursuit of their own interests.
But an inclusiveness paradigm can improve policy responses to these issues by offering useful benchmarks, tactics and strategies capable of mitigating structural disincentives and the risk of spoilers – whether national or international – undermining a transition.
Section 5: Inclusiveness Signposts

Measuring progress

Regardless of what instigates a transition – a popular uprising, regime-led reform, or the end of a civil war – and whether it is led by a coordinated set of elites, a military victor or election winners, inclusiveness offers a promising pathway to a successful result. It may not be easy or even likely in some countries, but the inclusiveness paradigm provides a clear concept with a successful track record for well-intentioned internal and external actors to adopt. It is not a coincidence that the most frequently cited examples of successful transition are those marked by inclusive approaches.

The ease of implementation of the approach will vary from one place to another. There are reasons why Tunisian leaders act inclusively and Syrian ones do not (e.g., the existing level of cohesiveness, the degree of institutionalisation of the state, the size of the middle class and the longer exposure to global norms). But inclusiveness as a paradigm can help leaders in any country trying to create more resilient, democratic, and dynamic societies. Likewise, for international actors, a laser-like focus on inclusiveness provides a clear and constructive metric for policymaking.

To monitor progress and advance initiatives aimed at achieving it, inclusiveness requires measurement criteria – what we call ‘signposts’. These do not provide a blueprint of the detailed mechanics for a successful transition, as much as suggest what areas should be focused on. They do not describe whether a country should be federal or unitary; use a presidential or parliamentary system; allocate resources for education or economic growth; and so on. There is a vast literature on these and other ‘transitional engineering’ choices. Instead, the signposts offer political, economic, socio-cultural and security criteria to gauge a country’s inclusiveness level. Not all will be equally relevant at all times; prioritisation between difficult trade-offs will be essential. Some will become less relevant when the transition process is over and a state ideally becomes more stable and the political process more institutionalised. But they will provide a meaningful set of measurements when taken as a whole during transitions and the years that immediately follow (as well as other crucial points in a country’s history), when societal stress levels are highest and institutions are least able to cope.

These signposts – which are formulated as a starting point for discussion and are thus not ordered in any particular fashion nor explained in detail – are intended to be used in conjunction with each other, as they are additive and interactive. In isolation, one bad signpost may be a warning signal but not necessarily cause for alarm, especially if leaders have consciously prioritised other issues. By contrast, when many signposts are positive or negative (or are moving strongly in one direction), they provide a meaningful measurement of a country’s transition prospects.

The exact needs of each country will vary. As such, the below list is only meant to serve as a guide for local leaders that could include them in a toolbox of movable parts as part of a transition “roadmap” based on context-driven policy sequencing, prioritisation and timelines. Building an inclusive society and state is a gradual
process that takes place over many years, rather than in one go. These signposts can give the whole process greater clarity and coherence.

**Political signposts**

- **Elites acting inclusively**
  - Government does not control the opposition through overt repression
  - Government does not control the opposition through manipulation of the constitutional rules
  - The opposition does not act violently
  - The government and opposition seek to establish political rules and resolve disputes through peaceful negotiations
  - Leaders do not act in an exclusionary way or seek to concentrate power in one or a few social groups

- **Power-sharing mechanisms**
  - Central government does not concentrate power in the hands of one or a few social groups at the expense of others
  - Significant power is decentralised to regional and/or local governments
  - Opposition is given a share of power
  - Significant checks on executive power are established (such as the legislature and courts)
  - Power is handed over peacefully through elections

- **Minority and gender protection mechanisms**
  - Equity in the allocation of funds and power
  - Breadth and depth of horizontal equities
  - Breadth and depth of gender equities

- **Commitment enforcing mechanisms**
  - Institutions capable of ensuring that the agreements made in peace treaties and political settlements are kept
  - Independence and robustness of electoral commission
  - Independence and robustness of courts, especially at highest level
  - Independence and robustness of corruption fighting institutions
  - Ability of key regulatory agencies to withstand political interference and attempts at corruption

- **Institutionalisation of the state and political arena**
  - Strength and policy orientation of political parties
  - Robustness of the bureaucracy and its autonomy from political interference
  - Capacity of government to actually get things done
  - Gradual approach to democratisation that views elections as part of a broader system of reforms rather than as a one-off event
Surveys of different social groups show limited difference in the perception of the political process, legitimacy of government and equity of state services.

**Economic signposts**

- Income and asset distribution across social groups and gender
  - Breadth and depth of economic and developmental horizontal inequities across social groups and regions
  - Distribution of growth and income generation
  - Ability of non-elites to access opportunity (licensing, etc.)
  - Reduction of barriers for informal businesses, informal labour markets, etc.
  - Breadth and depth of financial market access
  - Economic elites see the benefits of investing in inclusive job creation schemes

- Education and skills development across social groups and gender
  - Quality of school system
  - Practicality and quality of higher education studies
  - Breadth and depth of management and entrepreneurial training
  - Adult education opportunities for previously-excluded groups
  - Vocational skills development

- Equity and effectiveness of natural resources management regime
  - State’s ability to generate equitable return on natural resource assets and income
  - State’s ability to manage returns from natural resource rents for benefit of the country
  - Controls over corruption and political patronage tied to natural resource rents
  - Equity of distribution of gains from natural resources

- Ability of state to generate taxes from local sources and translate them into better infrastructure and public services for the whole population
  - Ability to tax incomes, property, sales, etc.
  - Ability to charge for services rendered
  - Equity of tax system
  - Independence and robustness of tax authorities

- Breadth of economy’s dynamism
  - Ability to generate jobs, especially for those in their 20s and 30s or who were historically excluded from opportunity
  - Ability to attract investment in manufacturing
Perception surveys of how various social groups view the economy and employment opportunities
- Quality of infrastructure across regions, especially transportation and energy
- Access of small and medium sized enterprises to capital

Socio-cultural signposts

- Overarching national narrative that synthesises/encompasses all major groups
  - Nation branding used as a tool to build pride in the national identity
  - Each group’s identity is recognised and integrated into national identity through language policies, choices of holidays, availability of media, etc.
  - Public education, the media, and leadership training are used to promote the overarching national narrative

- Initiatives to heal past wounds
  - A mixture of societal initiatives and official commissions to publicly examine root causes and consequences of past violence
  - Political leaders acknowledge publicly the mistakes made on behalf of the state or specific social groups
  - Return of property and compensation for losses incurred due to state actions
  - State resources are used to help historically-disadvantaged groups ‘catch up’ (e.g., through additional schooling, healthcare services, access to government contracts)
  - Education system and curricula are revised in order to not exacerbate societal divisions or conflict legacies

- Initiatives and programs to build horizontal social cohesion
  - Social and religious leaders publicly work together to solve problems across groups in an accommodating manner
  - Programs are launched that strengthen the inclusiveness of and institutionalise cooperation across civic groups, trade unions and business associations previously marked by divisiveness
  - National service programs are developed that increase the intermixing and integration of social and regional groups
  - Infrastructure investments are made that better integrate the country (such as highways, trains, cell networks, etc.) and increase the connectivity to power centres of historically excluded groups
  - Approaches to learning are adopted that strengthen tolerance of differences and resilience to extremist ideologies

Security and rule-of-law signposts

- Measures to counter radicalisation and violent extremism
Leaders, especially those from the same social group as extremists, take strong stand against violence and exclusionary actions and rhetoric

The state has strict rules on violent rhetoric and hate speech

Disarmament, demobilisation and, especially, reintegration of former combatants

Youth employment across regions and social groups

- Delivery of basic security and justice across social groups and genders
  - Security and lack of intimidation of opposition candidates, leaders of various factions and journalists
  - Reduction of availability of small arms and light weapons
  - Ability to combat gangs and drug trafficking
  - Robustness of court system and security sector
  - Harmonisation of formal and informal mechanisms to advance rule of law
  - Perceptions of different social groups of the fairness of the judicial system, actions of the police force and general public safety

- State’s monopolisation of violence
  - Control of all territory, especially in formerly uncontrolled, violent areas
  - Ability to subdue armed groups (from militias to tribes to drug gangs to violent extremists or secessionists)
  - Civilian control over the military
  - Cohesiveness, representativeness (of the diversity of the population), and discipline (ability to obey the rule of law and not act for the benefit of any particular part of society) of security forces

- Capacity of the state to provide the rule of law for economic purposes
  - Ease of movement of goods across territory and borders (no stoppages or petty corruption)
  - Effectiveness of property rights regime
  - Security of assets from confiscation, nationalisation, or informal taxation
  - Effectiveness of contract enforcement mechanisms
  - Transparency and equity of government contracting and regulating
Moving Forward

Many theories and approaches to democratic and post-conflict transition have been explored, tested and revised over the past four decades – but with results that often disappoint democrats and peace-builders alike. The successful cases remain the exception.

The Institute for Integrated Transitions (IFIT) is developing a new paradigm: one that is especially suited to the transversal challenges and opportunities of transitions in fragile states. That paradigm is centred on ‘inclusiveness’. It is advocated as the best organising principle to guide contemporary transition theory and practice.

In societies with weak institutions and deep ethnic, religious, class, ideological or other divisions, transitions can easily degenerate into fresh conflict or authoritarianism, or lapse into more permanent forms of instability that worsen national economies and livelihoods. Inclusiveness, well-conceived, can help avoid these results in a way that no other principle promises. It can be many things at once: a value, a guiding principle, a means, an end and a metric for evaluation. It can be a never-ending national project.

But the concept requires questioning and refinement. What will be the biggest challenges facing the practical achievement of an inclusive agenda and how can these be overcome? How can inclusion be built against a backdrop of weak institutions, endemic violence, and social fissures? How can the international community support a process of inclusiveness? These are just a few of the questions that will be explored at the expert workshop for which this paper has been prepared. The meeting’s insights and discussions will also help to shape a future practice-oriented Inclusive Transitions Handbook. The authors look forward to your expert contribution.
ANNEX 1

Questions for Discussion

The concept of inclusive transitions

- Is the concept of an inclusive transition useful? Why or why not?
- Does this paper raise the issues of greatest importance to countries in transition? Does it miss anything important?
- Is the distinction between social contract and social covenant useful?
- What are the major obstacles to the approach advocated in the paper?
- How can a process to create an inclusive social covenant be engineered?
- What are the most inspirational examples of inclusiveness in action in fragile states undergoing transition and what do those examples teach in terms of the key drivers and dynamics of shifts toward inclusive state-society and society-society relations?
- What is the proper role for the international community in bridging societal fault lines and in strengthening inclusive tendencies during a transition?
- How should the future Handbook address the challenge of prioritisation among the various inclusiveness signposts, considering that they cannot all be pursued with equal resources and energy at the same time?
- What are the principal trade-offs that can be anticipated in the pursuit of inclusive approaches and in what sequence should these be handled?

Political dimensions of inclusive transitions

- What do you think of the political signposts? How can they be improved?
- How can the incentives for inclusive elite behaviour be strengthened?
- How can inclusiveness be made an appealing political platform in a divided society in the midst of a transition? What strategies could help cultivate, during critical junctures, a political commitment to inclusiveness?
- What recommendations should the handbook make about the timing and the organisation of elections, bearing in mind the challenges of transition periods and the optimal desire for inclusive-minded candidates to become elected?
- How should states in transition cope with secessionist populations while maintaining an inclusive ethic?
- What mechanisms can compensate for weak institutions and weak commitment mechanisms? How can these be strengthened in the short term?
- What new ideas can more effectively reduce the marginalisation and security threats faced by minorities and those that lose power in the transition?
- What steps can ensure that political process and outcomes are maximally inclusive in the short- to medium-term?
- What role does technology have to play in supporting an inclusive political agenda? (e.g., the Indian “I Paid A Bribe” mobile phone application that helps combat corruption)
**Economic dimensions of inclusive transitions**

- What do you think of the economic signposts? How can they be improved?
- What steps can invigorate investment and job creation in the short- to medium-term?
- What steps can make growth and opportunity more inclusive in the short- to medium-term?
- How can institutional weaknesses that hold back the economy be compensated for?
- What can ensure natural resources are used for maximum benefit of a country and its people?
- What can improve the competitiveness of an economy?
- What can encourage business formation and growth?
- What steps can enhance the skills level and employability of the population in the short- to medium-term?
- How can local entrepreneurship best be supported?

**Socio-cultural dimensions of inclusive transitions**

- What do you think of the socio-cultural signposts? How can they be improved?
- How can a new inclusive national narrative be developed?
- What can build social cohesion, especially in the short- to medium-term?
- What can make minorities feel welcome? What steps can lock in protections for minorities?
- What steps will best ensure various media play a constructive role in building social cohesion and inclusiveness?
- What social media and other Internet-based tools can be used by the state to promote the national narrative and other pillars of inclusiveness during the transition?

**Security and rule-of-law dimensions of inclusive transitions**

- What do you think of the security and rule-of-law signposts? How can they be improved?
- How can security and the rule of law be enhanced in the short- to medium-term when a country has weak institutions?
- What new ideas can inclusiveness offer to counter extremism and radicalisation of groups?
- How can the political process be insulated from violence and intimidation?
- What should a state do when it lacks the capacity to ensure that it has a monopolisation on power? How should armed groups be handled under an inclusive paradigm?
- What can improve the rule of law for non-elites across a country?
- What might improve a government’s ability to regulate property rights, businesses, and commerce in a way that advances inclusiveness?
ANNEX 2

References


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